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Abstract: With the dawn of the emerging technologies in the field of vehicular environment, connected vehicles are advancing at a rapid speed. The advancement of such technologies helps people
daily, whether it is to reach from one place to another, avoid traffic, or prevent any hazardous incident
from occurring. Safety is one of the main concerns regarding the vehicular environment when it
comes to developing applications for connected vehicles. Connected vehicles depend on messages
known as basic safety messages (BSMs) that are repeatedly broadcast in their communication range in
order to obtain information regarding their surroundings. Different kinds of attacks can be initiated
by a vehicle in the network with malicious intent by inserting false information in these messages,
e.g., speed, direction, and position. This paper focuses on the position falsification attacks that can be
carried out in the vehicular environment and be avoided using the multi-BSM approach. Multi-BSM
uses consecutive multiple BSMs with different parameters to detect and warn other vehicles about
position falsification attacks. Multi-BSM is compared to other anomaly detection algorithms and
evaluated with rigorous simulations. Multi-BSM shows a high level of anomaly detection, even in
high vehicle density, with up to 97% accuracy rate compared to the respective algorithms.
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1. Introduction

and Juan-Carlos Cano

Connected vehicles are the face of transportation systems. Through these, the transportation system is upgraded to an intelligent transportation system. The quality of the
daily commute is being improved, and the communication is getting better. Safety applications are being developed for the betterment of the vehicular environment. Vehicular networks are being upgraded for vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I)
communications, which directly affects the wellbeing of the daily commuters. The road side
units (RSUs) play a vital role for the connected vehicles in the V2I communications. These
technologies empower dynamic communication in real time for the vehicular environment.
Nowadays, security and privacy are the most sought-after aspects regarding networks.
In [1], the authors comprehensively surveyed the authentication and privacy schemes
related to vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs).
A lot of data are shared through the vehicular network and are made available for the
consumption of the surrounding vehicles. This information contains important events as
well as regular updates about the generating source. Important events can be classified as
data regarding any road accidents, heavy traffic, and/or any relevant urgent information
that needs to be addressed in real time, whereas regular updates are messages that are
periodically generated by vehicles informing others about their speed, location, heading,
etc., known as basic safety messages (BSMs). In an ideal situation, the information is
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disseminated flawlessly in connected vehicles, but in actuality, this information is vulnerable to attacks initiated by malicious attacker vehicles present in the network. Schemes
need to be adopted to counter and detect attacks that are currently exploiting the network.
In [2], the authors surveyed identity-based cryptographic schemes used for the security
and privacy concerns in VANETs. The protection and safeguarding of the regular updates
are as vital as the important messages that are disseminated in a timely manner, as any
potential attacker could be listening in on the regular updates of the connected vehicles
and could launch different types of attacks depending on the attacker’s intention. In [3],
the authors proposed a secure data-sharing scheme for 5G-enabled vehicular networks
without using the RSUs.
Preventive measures need to be implemented to avoid any misfortunes. These attacks
could harm individuals either directly or indirectly. The attacks could be active in nature, in
which the attacker modifies the contents of the messages being disseminated, or the attack
could be passive, in which the attacker just listens to the information being conveyed from
one end to the other and uses it for its personal gains. Mechanisms are needed to check for
anomalies in the behavior of the connected vehicles present in the network to detect whether
they are legitimate vehicles or malicious attackers with ill intent. Such disturbances cause
harm to the commuters and degrade the performance of the network, and they need to be
dealt with swiftly. In [4], the authors proposed a privacy-preserving authentication scheme
known as CM-CPPA in 5G-enabled vehicular networks while decreasing the overhead
of communication.
The vehicular network is exposed to different kinds of attacks, and if preventive
measures are not taken then they could harm the individuals directly or indirectly. One
such attack is a black hole attack [5], in which the malicious nodes place themselves in
a suitable position in the network where the effects of the attacks can be maximized.
The malicious nodes pretend to have an optimal route for the dissemination of messages
in order to lure more vehicles. When the messages are sent to these malicious nodes, they
either drop the messages, redirect them, or use them for their own nefarious purposes.
Another attack that is orchestrated by the malicious nodes in the vehicular network is that
of a Sybil attack [6]. In this attack, the malicious node initiates the illusion of the existence
of multiple vehicles in the network and generates false information in order to take control
of the available network. The purpose of this attack could be to cause detriment of the
performance of the network or to harm the legitimate vehicles themselves. Another form
of attack that proves dangerous in the network is that of a wormhole attack [7]. This is
somewhat similar to the black hole attack, in which at least two malicious attacker nodes
place themselves in an optimum position to enhance the damage of their attack and form a
tunnel with the lowest number of hop counts to entrap other legitimate vehicles for opting
for the attacker’s tunnel route. Once the legitimate vehicles start sending messages through
the attacker’s route, the malicious nodes can do anything with the received information;
they can either drop the message, modify it, redirect it, or eavesdrop on it. Position
falsification attack [8] is another critical attack that can be deployed in connected vehicles.
In this attack, the malicious attacker broadcasts false information regarding the position of
the vehicles through safety messages that are generated on a periodic basis. This attack can
create confusion among the connected vehicles and can cause severe repercussions.
Safety applications are being deployed in the vehicular network to achieve the required
safety and convenience for individuals. For these applications to work optimally and stay
up to date, connected vehicles need to be made aware of their surrounding environment
through BSMs. Through these messages, the connected vehicles are updated about their
surroundings and make appropriate decisions regarding any event. The BSMs need to
be generated and transmitted in real time because they become irrelevant after a certain
period of time, e.g., the information about a vehicle’s speed and location may be useless
after an hour or two later unless it is used by law enforcement authorities. Due to the
time-criticality, these messages are often not encrypted. Some mechanisms may encrypt
BSM as well, but at the cost of the network performance [9]. These BSMs are exposed
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to various attacks that can be initiated in the network which can cause severe harm to
the victims. Figure 1 shows a scenario in which the RSU detects an attacker vehicle and
relays information to other RSUs and vehicles.

Figure 1. RSU detecting an attacker and forwarding information to other connected RSUs and vehicles.

Our proposed scheme uses the multi-BSM approach for anomaly detection; more
specifically, position falsification attacks. The proposed scheme compares multiple consecutive BSMs from the same vehicles based on multiple parameters, i.e., location, speed,
and direction. It is assumed that all RSUs are linked with each other and are connected
with a central database. It is also assumed that Global Positioning System (GPS) systems
of genuine vehicles are working correctly. Only malicious vehicles tamper with the GPS
data. Our work targets the detection and prevention of position falsification attacks in a
connected vehicular environment. The salient features of the papers are following:
•
•

•

The detection of position falsification attacks using multiple consecutive BSMs utilizing parameters such as position, speed, and direction is proposed.
The RSUs are used for the detection of position falsification attacks, as onboard units
(OBUs) of the vehicles have limited resources and may not be connected to the central
database in real time.
Preventing vehicles from falling victims to the attacks of a malicious node even before
entering the transmission range of the attacker with the help of RSUs.

Section 2 reviews the work that has been accomplished in the connected vehicles
regarding anomaly detection and security attacks. The preliminaries and the system model
are discussed in Section 3. The proposed scheme is elaborated in Section 4. After that,
performance evaluation is discussed in Section 5, followed by conclusion and future work
in Sections 6 and 7. Lastly, acknowledgments are addressed.
2. Literature Review
The connected vehicles are susceptible to different types of attacks in the vehicular
environment. An effective mechanism is needed to detect and prevent these attacks to
ensure the safety of the individuals. The work that has been carried out in this regard
is discussed in this section. Table 1 lists some of the network attacks and the detection
algorithms used for the respective attacks.
Meyer et al. [10] worked on the detection of network anomalies, e.g., DDoS, by implementing their proposed scheme on the link layer. They also worked on the deployment of
an SDN controller for reconfiguring the network when an attack is being carried out or in
the case of an incident, conveying the information to a cloud infrastructure. It has been
seen that connected vehicles are vulnerable to many attacks when it comes to a realistic
vehicular environment by exploiting messages that are injected into the controller area
network (CAN) bus. In [11], Othmane et al. proposed a mechanism that could detect
whether the vehicle is under attack or not by using the revolutions per minute (RPM) and
speed reading. They used the k-means clustering method and HMM to characterize the
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vehicles as either under attack or no attack. They had acceptable detection and accuracy
rate but also a high false-positive rate.
In today’s era, 5G helps in improving the data transmission between vehicles in a
connected environment, but with the increase in the exchange of information, there is
also a rise in the attacks on the network. Ji et al. [12] explored the conceivable attacks
that could be initiated in a vehicular network regarding 5G and came up with intrusion
detection mechanisms to counter such attacks by comparative study. Grover et al. [13] used
an algorithm that detects anomalies in BSMs by monitoring the inconsistencies in position
and speed with which the vehicles generate packets. The detection algorithm runs at RSUs.
The investigation of in-vehicle communication is a gap that needs to be filled with
extensive research, and researchers are improving daily to detect and prevent the network
attacks that are carried out in the connected vehicles. Stabili et al. [14] proposed a mechanism for intrusion detection whose main goal is to recognize the hostile messages that are
targeted at the CAN bus. The proposed algorithm was developed and administered with
low-end electronic control units (ECUs).
Table 1. Comparison of different attacks and proposed algorithms in connected vehicles.
Suitable
Area

Information
Coverage

Attack
Type

Detection
Algorithm

Simulator

Katragadda et al. [15]

Generic

X

Replay-based
injection

Subsequence
mining

-

Comert et al. [16]

Generic

X

DOS, impersonation

EM, CUSUM

-

Negi et al. [17]

Generic

X

Misbehaviour

LSTM

MXNet

Petrenkov et al. [18]

Generic

X

Spoofing

Consensus control

Plexe, OMNeT++

D’Angelo et al. [19]

Generic

X

DOS, fuzzy, RPM

Cluster-based,
data-driven

MATLAB

Berlin et al. [20]

Generic

X

Credentials theft

SeMaCoCa

-

Gautham et al. [21]

Generic

X

Black hole

AODV

NS2

Leinmuller et al. [22]

Urban/motorway

X

Position falsification

Cooperative
position verification

NS2

Heijden et al. [23]

Urban

X

Position falsification

Subjective logic

OMNeT++, SUMO,
VEINS

Grover et al. [13]

Highway

X

Position falsification

RSU verification

NCTUns

Boeira et al. [24]

Highway

X

Position falsification

Vouch

Plexe, OMNeT++

Proposed scheme

Urban

X

Position
Falsification

Multi-BSM

OMNeT++, SUMO,
VEINS

Connected vehicles play a vital role in the uprising of the intelligent transportation
system, and the connectivity is increasing on a daily basis. Such connectivity does not
require elaborate attacks to disturb the flow of the traffic, just some misleading data would
be enough for the job. Ranaweera et al. [25] proposed traffic flow theory to improve
the detection of anomalous data which can lead to attacks in the vehicular environment.
Their results displayed uniform and reliable foresight, while in Boeira et al. [24], the 5Genabled wireless RSUs employ the proof-of-location technique, which in turn utilizes the
node-positioning capabilities of the RSUs.
The safety of the vehicles in a connected environment is ensured by the continuous
exchange of information between the vehicles themselves and the RSUs. Thus, the exchange
of information needs to be clear and free of misleading data. A filtering scheme is required
to block out fake and misleading information to ensure the safety of individuals in the
vehicular network. Xiong et al. [26] proposed a filtering scheme (EDFS) that is established
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on detection and clustering-based algorithm to detect counterfeit information which relies
on the characteristics of the data and context without the help of RSUs.
The availability of the network is one of the crucial factors in the vehicular environment.
If the network is not available, then no exchange of information takes place, which can lead
to many disastrous events. Haydari et al. [27] focused on the DDoS attacks that targeted
the RSUs in the network. A DDoS attack can render a system useless and deprive other
entities of its resources. The authors proposed a framework for dealing with the detection
and alleviation of low-rate DDoS attacks aimed at the RSUs which are hard to differentiate
due to the fact that they evade certain filtering mechanisms.
Due to the highly dynamic and rapid nature of the vehicular network, it has multiple
vulnerabilities and is prone to many security attacks, e.g., DoS/DDoS attacks. A security
mechanism was proposed by Valentini et al. [28], which prioritizes the wellbeing of individuals in vehicular networks by developing a statistical model which searches for extreme
values that can be caused by the DoS/DDoS attacks. The proposed mechanism consumes a
considerable amount of MAC frames, ARP requests, and features of DoS/DDoS attacks
that are initiated by attacker vehicles with malicious intent.
VANETs always play a crucial role in the development of a new breed of self-driving
and semi-self-driving vehicles. Safety and comfort are not only provided to the passengers
and drivers, but to the vehicles themselves, though such a network of vehicles is vulnerable
to attacks such as black hole, gray hole, and rushing attacks. Alheeti et al. [29] proposed an
intelligent intrusion detection system (IDS) that protects the vehicles in the network from
the gray hole and rushing attacks by detecting the anomalous behavior of the malicious
nodes. These types of attacks are aimed to avert the transmissions that take place between
the vehicles and the RSUs which can have fatal consequences for the new breed of selfdriving and semi-self-driving vehicles.
An effective misbehavior detection system (MDS) is needed to detect the erroneous
information that is transmitted from the insider attacker nodes in the vehicular network. Sultana et al. [30] proposed a software-defined networking (SDN)-based detection framework
for misbehaving vehicles with malicious intents. The authors exploited the characteristics
of SDN, allowing them to dynamically change the parameters for the input according to
the changing network.
Gu et al. [31] proposed a clustering-based detection mechanism for false downstream
data in a fog-enabled vehicular environment. The authors used the fog servers to detect
the malicious cluster head nodes and their anomalous data. They developed a clustering
technique to accurately choose cluster head nodes and edge monitoring nodes for the
detection of misbehaving vehicles and their malicious data.
Ensuring trust levels in the vehicular environment is a very important factor that is
often neglected. Higher trust levels mean that vehicles can safely exchange information with
each other without any worries. A higher trust level also deals with many vulnerabilities
that vehicles are exposed to in a connected environment. Li et al. [32] proposed a trust
management mechanism that actively detects malicious nodes in the network and prevents
their attacks which can degrade or cripple the network, while the use of blockchain ensures
the trustworthiness of the data being exchanged.
3. Preliminaries
The multi-BSM is used to detect anomalies in the communication of the connected
vehicles, i.e., position falsification attacks, to be more specific. The anomaly detection
algorithm runs on the RSUs which are better equipped with more computational resources.
It is assumed that all RSUs are connected with each other and the RSUs have real-time
communication with a centralized database that contains information about the flagged
vehicles and all other relevant information. Multi-BSM is better suited for an urban
environment as it is more developed compared to rural areas.
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System Model
The channel fading affects the overall network performance, so to model this scenario
for wireless communication, the Nakagami distribution [33] is used to represent it.
Γmx2 /Ω (m)
Γ(m)
m
2
2mm
x2m−1
= e− Ω x
Γ(m)Ωm

p( x; m, Ω) = 1 −

The cumulative distributive function for signal reception is represented by

(1)
(2)
Γmx2 /Ω (m)
,
Γ(m)

where x2 stands for the reception threshold of signal propagation and Γ stands for gamma
function. The average power level for the received signal is given as Ω. The fading
parameter m is determined on the basis of the distance between the vehicles i and j:

 3.0
m=
1.5

1.0

: d < 50 m
: 50 m ≤ d < 150 m
: otherwise

(3)

The average communication transmission scope [34] of the transmitter can be communicated as



 1   m −1 Γ 1 + 1
β
β
pt K
1
r̄ =
(4)
mΥ0 W
β k∑
k!
=0
where the transmission power is denoted by pt , path loss coefficient by β, and the fading
coefficient of the Nakagami channel is represented by m. The carrier-to-noise ratio threshold
is represented by Υ0 and the total input noise power of an authentic receiver is indicated
by W, whereas K represents the constant for the path loss model and is defined as
K=

A t Ar C 2
4π f c

(5)

The gain of the transmitting antenna is represented by At , whereas the gain of the
receiving antenna is represented by Ar . The speed of light is denoted by C, and the carrier
frequency is expressed as f c .
The vehicles communicate with each other as well as with neighboring RSUs. Therefore, the time the messages take to propagate from the sending entity to the receiving entity
can be calculated as follows [35]:
t p = tr − t s
(6)
The propagation time of the message is represented by t p ; tr represents the timestamp
of the message reception, whereas ts represents the timestamp of the message of when it
was sent.
Using Equation (6) and the average velocity of a vehicle v, the distance between the
two entities can be derived as
d = tp × v
(7)
If d > r̄, then the RSU can forward the relevant important information to the neighboring RSU depending on the direction of the flagged or authentic vehicle.
4. Proposed Scheme (Multi-BSM Approach)
RSUs are responsible for detecting anomalies in the network. It is assumed that all the
RSUs are legitimate and no malicious RSU is present. All the RSUs are connected to each
other and linked with a centralized database that contains all the relevant important information. The centralized database is only accessed through RSUs and contains information
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about the connected vehicles present in the network, and the information is available to
RSUs in real time.
The multi-BSM approach is used to detect anomalies, i.e., position falsification attacks,
to be specific, in the vehicular connected environment. Every vehicle that joins the network
shares its basic information such as speed, direction, location, etc., to its surrounding
neighbors, e.g., RSUs and other vehicles.
4.1. Attacker’s Model
The nature of any attacker in the network can be broken down into the following modes:
4.1.1. Active or Passive Attack
The mode of attack in which an attacker is directly involved in the participation of
tempering of the information and/or degrading the network is known as the active attack,
while the passive attacker only eavesdrops on the information that is being conveyed in
the network which can be used for personal or malicious purposes.
4.1.2. Inside or Outside Attack
The attack in which the individual has valid credentials of the network while initiating
the said attack is known as an inside attack, while in the outside attack, the individual does
not have authentication.
4.1.3. Malicious or Rational Attack
An attack on the network that is initiated by an individual with the sole aim of personal
gains is known as a rational attack, while the aim of the malicious attacker is to harm and
degrade the network.
For the simulation purpose, we focused on an active inside attacker whose intention
may be rational or malicious. The types of position falsification attacks that were addressed
during the simulations are discussed as follows:
•
•
•

Attack Type 1: In this type of position falsification attack, the attacker broadcasts a
fixed position in the BSMs that is periodically generated.
Attack Type 2: In this, the attacker broadcasts a random position in the BSMs that is
periodically generated.
Attack Type 3: In this, the attacker pretends to be a legitimate vehicle for a certain period by broadcasting genuine information in BSMs and initiates a position falsification
attack by broadcasting the same position persistently after a while.

4.2. Detection and Prevention of Position Falsification Attack
As the RSUs are aware of their surroundings and are capable of detecting anomalies in
the network when a BSM is received at RSU from a vehicle, it firstly checks all the relevant
data in the BSM and scans the centralized database for the previous BSM of the same
vehicle. If the previous BSM of the same vehicle does not exist in the records, then the
received BSM is documented for that specific vehicle. If the previous BSMs of the same
vehicle are found in the records, then the RSU compares the current BSM with the previous
BSMs to detect any anomaly that may be present in the concerned data, e.g., position
falsification attack that may be initiated by a malicious attacker with an intent to cause
harm. These position falsification attack data vary a lot from the legitimate data that are
being generated by an authentic vehicle, as the specific fields in the BSM have quite extreme
changing of values.Upon the detection of the position falsification attack, the next step is
to alert the connected vehicles and prevent any harm that can be caused by such attacks.
Algorithm 1 describes the anomaly detection that takes place at an RSU.
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Algorithm 1 Anomaly detection at RSU.
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:
15:

RSU ← Mb
for i = 1; i ++; i < db.size do
if db.Mb == Mb then
Mbt ← φ
if Mb == φ then
flag Mi
broadcast(Mi )
transmit(Mi ) → RSU Md
i
else
Mbt = Mb
end if
else
db = Mb
end if
end for

To accurately detect the position falsification attack, the BSMs are thoroughly checked
with the previous BSMs of the same vehicle. In order to detect Attack Type 1, the parameters
for the location, speed, and direction are analyzed, in which the malicious vehicle is
periodically generating the same position. It can be observed that the position of the
vehicle is not changing; it is pretending to be at a stationary location, but the values of the
speed parameter are not zero, and the direction is also sometimes changing. This triggers
the detection of the anomaly present in the BSMs, and the concerned vehicle is flagged
as malicious.
In Attack Type 2, the malicious vehicle randomly broadcasts its position through the
periodic generation of BSMs, and the RSU, after acquiring these BSMs, analyzes the data.
In the respective BSMs, the values for location updates vary a lot from the previously
generated location as they are random in nature. These large variations in the location
updates trigger the anomaly detection, and the RSU flags the vehicle as malicious because
such distances cannot be covered with the given speed of the respective vehicle.
Attack Type 3 is more difficult to detect because the malicious vehicle generates
genuine information for some time, containing legitimate information updates on the
respective vehicle, but after a while, the malicious vehicle starts broadcasting the same
location updates in the BSMs to pretend that the vehicle has come to a stop. The RSU,
after accumulating enough BSMs for the respective vehicle, can detect the anomaly in the
information by comparing the consecutive BSMs and analyzing the different parameters in
the BSM.
After detecting the position falsification attack, the next step is to prevent it. When
an RSU detects a malicious attacker, first of all, it flags the vehicle, updates the database,
and broadcasts the information about the attacker in its transmission range. The RSU also
transmits and alerts other RSUs as they are all connected. The RSU that detected the position
falsification attack initiated by the malicious vehicle transmits the relevant information to
the other RSUs in the direction of the attacker to prevent the legitimate vehicle from falling
victim to the attacker’s plan. The Figure 2 shows how a legitimate vehicle B is alerted and
made aware of a malicious attacker vehicle A about the position falsification attack even
before the legitimate vehicle B came into the transmission range of the attacker vehicle
A due to the connectivity of the RSUs between each other. The legitimate vehicles, upon
receiving the message about the attacker, store the information on the local log of flagged
vehicles. As shown in Figure 2, the first step is detecting a malicious attacker vehicle by
RSU. After detection, the RSU, in the next step, transmits the information regarding the
malicious attacker vehicle to the neighboring RSU in the direction of the said vehicle. In the
next step, the neighboring RSU, upon receiving the information, broadcasts the message to
the vehicles in its vicinity. Thus, vehicle B is alerted about vehicle A even before coming
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into the transmission range of vehicle A. Figure 3 shows the structure of the BSM whereas
Figure 4 describes the flow of information at an RSU.

Figure 2. RSU detecting an attacker vehicle and alerting others.

Figure 3. Showing the structure of a basic safety message.
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Figure 4. Multi-BSM.

5. Performance Evaluation
False BSM information can lead to many mishaps, including damage to the vehicles
and/or the individuals involved in the said scenario. Misinformation can be very dangerous
if not dealt with promptly. The network simulator used to assess the proposed mechanism
is OMNeT++ version 5.1.1 [36], together with SUMO version 0.25 [37] and VEINS version
4.6 [38]. The multi-BSM is compared with Grover et al. [13] and vouch scheme [24].
In Grover et al., the algorithm to detect the anomalies in the periodic beacons is operated
at the RSUs. According to the algorithm, a vehicle is considered malicious if there are
inconsistencies in the position and speed of the generated consecutive packets from the
respective vehicle, whereas in the vouch scheme, the proof-of-location method utilizes the
node-positioning capabilities of 5G-enabled wireless RSUs.
5.1. Simulation Setup
The simulations are evaluated in an urban scenario. The vehicle density is kept between 30–125 vehicles and inserted at random intervals to simulate the urban environment.
The simulations are evaluated for a period of 500 s and an average of 40 runs. Further
details about the simulation environment are shown in Table 2.
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Table 2. Simulation Parameters.
Parameters

Values

Simulation area
Simulation time
Simulation runs
Transmission range
Transmission power
Road type
Data transmission rate
MAC protocol
Vehicle density
Vehicle velocity
Maximum acceleration
Distribution model
EM packet size
Beacon packet size
Road side units

3 km × 3 km
500 s
40
250 m
20 mW
Two-way traffic
6 Mbps
IEEE 802.11p WAVE
30–125/km
12–20 m/s
2.6 m/s2
Nakagami
170 bytes
194 bytes
Yes

5.2. Results and Discussion
The proposed and comparison mechanisms are evaluated based on position falsification attacks discussed in the above section, and the accuracy of each anomaly detection
mechanism is compared.
The metrics used to evaluate the detection algorithm are described in the following nomenclature.
•
•
•
•

True positive (TP): The BSM that contains fake or manipulated information regarding
the respective vehicle and is correctly identified as an anomaly.
True negative (TN): The BSM that contains legitimate information regarding the
respective vehicle and is classified as genuine information.
False positive (FP): The BSM that contains legitimate information regarding the respective vehicle and is incorrectly classified as an anomaly.
False negative (FN): The BSM that contains fake or manipulated information regarding the respective vehicle and is incorrectly identified as genuine information.
The accuracy rate (ACR) is calculated based on the above-given variables as follows:

TP + TN
(8)
TP + TN + FP + FN
Table 3 shows a brief overview of the dataset used for anomaly detection. The parameters loc_1x, loc_1y, loc_2x, loc_2y, loc_3x, and loc_3y are the location coordinates of three
consecutive BSMs of each vehicle, whereas speed_1, speed_2, and speed_3 are the values
of speed in m/sec for the concerned BSMs. The dir_1, dir_2, and dir_3 represent the direction of the vehicle in radians for the consecutive BSMs. The flag parameters show the status
of vehicles, where 0 represents a legitimate vehicle and 1 represents a malicious vehicle.
ACR =

Table 3. Brief overview of the dataset used for anomaly detection.
Veh
No.

loc_1x

loc_1y

speed_1 dir_1

loc_2x

loc_2y

speed_2 dir_2

loc_3x

loc_3y

speed_3 dir_3

1
2
3
4

1253.61
3719.27
2593.32
1129.07

2271.19
6241.43
3374.28
2316.19

12.12
14.07
15.10
13.76

1254.83
3721.01
2815.32
1130.87

2273.54
6243.50
3624.28
2317.38

12.14
14.08
15.11
13.77

1255.11
3723.89
2947.27
1132.02

2275.11
6244.77
3871.82
2318.05

12.13
14.08
15.11
13.77

1.5707
0.7142
2.7981
2.4639

1.5713
0.7148
2.7990
2.4677

1.5710
0.7146
2.7985
2.4613

Flag
0
0
1
0
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5.2.1. Impact of Vehicle Density
The density of vehicles always plays a vital role in the evaluation of any proposed
algorithm in a connected vehicular environment. As more and more vehicles are connected
to the network, the vehicle density can either increase the performance of a certain algorithm
with its increase or decrease the performance with increasing density. The algorithms are
evaluated with three different densities of vehicles, i.e., low, medium, and high. The low
density consists of 30–50 vehicles/km, the medium density consists of 51–80 vehicles/km
and the high density consists of 81–125 vehicles/km.
All three algorithms were evaluated in the respective attack scenarios, and each
algorithm performed very well when the density of the connected vehicles was kept low,
as shown in Table 4. They showed even better performance in Attack Type 3, which is a
little harder to detect as compared to the first two attack types.
Table 4. Comparison of accuracy rate in low vehicle density.
Algorithm

Attack Type 1

Attack Type 2

Attack Type 3

Grover et al. [13]
Vouch [24]
Multi-BSM

100
100
100

100
100
100

100
100
100

The respective algorithms were evaluated in the medium vehicle density to inspect the
accuracy rate of each algorithm, as shown in Table 5. It was observed that the algorithms
performed well when it came to the first two attack scenarios; however, there was a
slight decrease in the accuracy rate regarding the Attack Type 3 scenario as the attacker
vehicle pretended to be a legitimate vehicle for some time before initiating the position
falsification attack.
Lastly, the accuracy rate of the algorithms was evaluated in the high density of connected vehicles ranging from 81–125 vehicles/km as shown in Table 6. The first two attack
scenarios were accurately detected by multi-BSM and vouch scheme; however, Grover et al.
showed a little decrease in the accuracy rate of Attack Type 2. All the three compared
algorithms showed a decrease in accuracy rate regarding Attack Type 3, with Grover et al.
being the lowest in comparison to the other two algorithms.
Table 5. Comparison of accuracy rate in medium vehicle density.
Algorithm

Attack Type 1

Attack Type 2

Attack Type 3

Grover et al. [13]
Vouch [24]
Multi-BSM

100
100
100

99
100
100

97.1
98.2
99

Table 6. Comparison of accuracy rate in high vehicle density.
Algorithm

Attack Type 1

Attack Type 2

Attack Type 3

Grover et al. [13]
Vouch [24]
Multi-BSM

100
100
100

98
100
100

94.9
96.3
97

Figure 5 shows the correlation between energy consumption and vehicle density in
the increasing order at the RSU. It can be seen that the vouch algorithm consumes the most
energy as the density of the vehicles is increased. The multi-BSM and Grover algorithms
are somewhat similar in consumption of the energy, with the multi-BSM being a bit higher.
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Figure 5. The energy consumption of the algorithms at the RSU.

5.2.2. Impact of Different Intervals on BSM
The different intervals with which the BSMs are generated also affect the performance
of the multi-BSM. As more vehicles enter the connected environment, more BSMs are
generated, and if the generation interval is kept very low then it could clutter the network
performance. The control messages also need to be regulated so that they do not clog the
network for other emergency messages that need to be disseminated in a timely manner.
Therefore, the intervals of BSMs generation also play a vital role in the performance of the
multi-BSM.
Figure 6a shows the relationship between the increasing vehicle density with average transmission delay regarding the different intervals. It can be seen that the average
transmission delay is kept at the lowest with the increase in the vehicle density when the
generation interval is kept at 50 ms.
Figure 6b shows the relationship between the packet delivery ratio with increasing
vehicle density regarding different intervals. As more vehicles are entering the network,
more BSMs are being generated, which in turn affects the packet delivery ratio; therefore,
a suitable interval should be adoptedto improve the packet delivery ratio. As seen in
Figure 6b, the packet delivery ratio is at its lowest when the BSM interval is kept at 15 ms
and performs better at 50 ms.
Figure 6c describes the comparison of the vehicle’s velocity to the packet delivery ratio
regarding different BSM intervals. The velocity of the vehicles is inversely proportional to
the packet delivery ratio. The ephemeral effect is observed in vehicles with high velocities
and the packet delivery ratio performs better when the BSM intervals are kept at 50 ms.
The packet delivery ratio decreases with a decrease in the intervals as more BSMs are
generated frequently, which can cause congestion in the network.
Figure 7 shows the average routing delay alongside the number of packets that are
being sent through the network. It is being observed that the most routing delay is incurred
in the vouch algorithm, with the Grover and multi-BSM close to each other.
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(a)

(b)

(c)
Figure 6. Multi-BSM evaluated in accordance with different intervals of BSM generations. (a) Average
transmission delay vs. vehicle density. (b) Packet delivery ratio vs. vehicle density. (c) Packet delivery
ratio vs. velocity.

Figure 7. The comparison of average routing delays of the algorithms.

6. Conclusions
Position falsification attacks can be very dangerous; if they are not detected in the connected vehicular environment, they can cause minor mishaps to life-threatening incidents.
In this paper, we proposed and evaluated the multi-BSM approach for the detection of
anomalies, i.e., position falsification attacks, to be more precise. It was proven to be quite
effective in detecting attacks. The multi-BSM also alerts the legitimate vehicles about the
attacker present in the network even when the legitimate vehicle is not in the transmission
range of the attacker vehicle. The RSUs demonstrate optimum real-time detection and
prevention as they are equipped with better computational resources than those of vehicle
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OBUs. All the RSUs are connected with each other and linked to a central database, which
assures a better anomaly detection in real time. However, our work is limited to position
falsification attacks at the current level, and we are not targeting other attacks that malicious
attackers can initiate. This area has a lot of potential for future work.
7. Future Work
As discussed, there is a lot of potential for security aspects of vehicular communications. This paper targets position falsification attacks, but other attacks can also be handled
by tweaking the mechanism to the respective attacks. The introduction of fog computing
can also be of great service in this area instead of opting for cloud services. The V2X security
credentials management and assessment are also relevant potential areas that the authors
are currently exploring for future work.
Author Contributions: Writing—original draft, Z.T., S.S.S. and K.H. All authors have read and
agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research was funded by United Arab Emirates University (UAEU) Program for
Advanced Research (UPAR) under grant number 31T122 and Zayed University Cluster grant number R20140.
Data Availability Statement: Not applicable.
Acknowledgments: This work was supported by United Arab Emirates University (UAEU) Program
for Advanced Research (UPAR) under grant number 31T122 and Zayed University Cluster grant
number R20140.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

References
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.

14.

Al-Shareeda, M.A.; Anbar, M.; Hasbullah, I.H.; Manickam, S. Survey of authentication and privacy schemes in vehicular ad hoc
networks. IEEE Sens. J. 2020, 21, 2422–2433. [CrossRef]
Al-Shareeda, M.A.; Anbar, M.; Manickam, S.; Khalil, A.; Hasbullah, I.H. Security and Privacy Schemes in Vehicular Ad-Hoc
Network With Identity-Based Cryptography Approach: A Survey. IEEE Access 2021, 9, 121522–121531. [CrossRef]
Al-Shareeda, M.A.; Manickam, S.; Mohammed, B.A.; Al-Mekhlafi, Z.G.; Qtaish, A.; Alzahrani, A.J.; Alshammari, G.; Sallam,
A.A.; Almekhlafi, K. Provably Secure with Efficient Data Sharing Scheme for Fifth-Generation (5G)-Enabled Vehicular Networks
without Road-Side Unit (RSU). Sustainability 2022, 14, 9961. [CrossRef]
Al-Shareeda, M.A.; Manickam, S.; Mohammed, B.A.; Al-Mekhlafi, Z.G.; Qtaish, A.; Alzahrani, A.J.; Alshammari, G.; Sallam, A.A.;
Almekhlafi, K. Cm-cppa: Chaotic map-based conditional privacy-preserving authentication scheme in 5g-enabled vehicular
networks. Sensors 2022, 22, 5026. [CrossRef] [PubMed]
Zaidi, T.; Faisal, S. An overview: Various attacks in VANET. In Proceedings of the 2018 4th International Conference on
Computing Communication and Automation (ICCCA), Greater Noida, India, 14–15 December 2018; pp. 1–6.
Douceur, J.R. The sybil attack. In Peer-to-Peer Systems, Proceedings of the First International Workshop, IPTPS 2002, Cambridge, MA,
USA, 7–8 March 2002; Springer: Berlin/Heidelberg, Germany, 2002; pp. 251–260.
Hu, Y.C.; Perrig, A.; Johnson, D.B. Wormhole attacks in wireless networks. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 2006, 24, 370–380.
Almalki, S.A.; Song, J. A review on data falsification-based attacks in cooperative intelligent transportation systems. Int. J.
Comput. Sci. Secur. (IJCSS) 2020, 14, 22.
Kanchan, S.; Chaudhari, N.S. SRCPR: SignReCrypting proxy re-signature in secure VANET groups. IEEE Access 2018, 6,
59282–59295. [CrossRef]
Meyer, P.; Häckel, T.; Korf, F.; Schmidt, T.C. Network anomaly detection in cars based on time-sensitive ingress control. In
Proceedings of the 2020 IEEE 92nd Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2020-Fall), Victoria, BC, Canada, 18 November–16
December 2020; pp. 1–5.
Othmane, L.B.; Dhulipala, L.; Abdelkhalek, M.; Multari, N.; Govindarasu, M. On the performance of detecting injection of
fabricated messages into the CAN bus. IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2020, 19, 468–481. [CrossRef]
Ji, H.; Wang, Y.; Qin, H.; Wang, Y.; Li, H. Comparative performance evaluation of intrusion detection methods for in-vehicle
networks. IEEE Access 2018, 6, 37523–37532. [CrossRef]
Grover, J.; Gaur, M.S.; Laxmi, V. Position forging attacks in vehicular ad hoc networks: Implementation, impact and detection. In
Proceedings of the 2011 7th International Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing Conference, Istanbul, Turkey, 4–8
July 2011; pp. 701–706.
Stabili, D.; Marchetti, M.; Colajanni, M. Detecting attacks to internal vehicle networks through Hamming distance. In Proceedings
of the 2017 AEIT International Annual Conference, Cagliari, Italy, 20–22 September 2017; pp. 1–6.

Electronics 2022, 11, 3282

15.
16.
17.

18.

19.
20.
21.

22.
23.

24.

25.

26.
27.

28.
29.

30.

31.
32.
33.

34.
35.
36.

37.
38.

16 of 16

Katragadda, S.; Darby, P.J.; Roche, A.; Gottumukkala, R. Detecting low-rate replay-based injection attacks on in-vehicle networks.
IEEE Access 2020, 8, 54979–54993. [CrossRef]
Comert, G.; Rahman, M.; Islam, M.; Chowdhury, M. Change Point Models for Real-time Cyber Attack Detection in Connected
Vehicle Environment. IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst. 2021, 23, 12328–12342. [CrossRef]
Negi, N.; Jelassi, O.; Chaouchi, H.; Clemençon, S. Distributed online data anomaly detection for connected vehicles. In
Proceedings of the 2020 International Conference on Artificial Intelligence in Information and Communication (ICAIIC), Fukuoka,
Japan, 19–21 February 2020; pp. 494–500.
Petrenkov, D.; Agafonov, A. Anomaly Detection in Vehicle Platoon with Third-Order Consensus Control. In Proceedings of the
2021 Ural Symposium on Biomedical Engineering, Radioelectronics and Information Technology (USBEREIT), Yekaterinburg,
Russia, 13–14 May 2021; pp. 463–466.
D’Angelo, G.; Castiglione, A.; Palmieri, F. A cluster-based multidimensional approach for detecting attacks on connected vehicles.
IEEE Internet Things J. 2020, 8, 12518–12527. [CrossRef]
Berlin, O.; Held, A.; Matousek, M.; Kargl, F. POSTER: Anomaly-based misbehaviour detection in connected car backends. In
Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE Vehicular Networking Conference (VNC), Columbus, OH, USA, 8–10 December 2016; pp. 1–2.
Gautham, P.S.; Shanmughasundaram, R. Detection and isolation of Black Hole in VANET. In Proceedings of the 2017 International
Conference on Intelligent Computing, Instrumentation and Control Technologies (ICICICT), Kannur, India, 6–7 July 2017;
pp. 1534–1539.
Leinmüller, T.; Schoch, E.; Kargl, F.; Maihöfer, C. Decentralized position verification in geographic ad hoc routing. Secur. Commun.
Netw. 2010, 3, 289–302. [CrossRef]
Van der Heijden, R.W.; Al-Momani, A.; Kargl, F.; Abu-Sharkh, O.M.F. Enhanced position verification for VANETs using subjective
logic. In Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE 84th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC-Fall), Montreal, QC, Canada, 18–21 September
2016; pp. 1–7.
Boeira, F.; Asplund, M.; Barcellos, M.P. Vouch: A secure proof-of-location scheme for vanets. In Proceedings of the 21st ACM
International Conference on Modeling, Analysis and Simulation of Wireless and Mobile Systems, Montreal, QC, Canada, 28
October–2 November 2018; pp. 241–248.
Ranaweera, M.; Seneviratne, A.; Rey, D.; Saberi, M.; Dixit, V.V. Anomalous data detection in vehicular networks using traffic
flow theory. In Proceedings of the 2019 IEEE 90th Vehicular Technology Conference (VTC2019-Fall), Honolulu, HI, USA, 22–25
September 2019; pp. 1–5.
Xiong, G.; Zhang, D.; Xu, J. An Effective Data Filtering Scheme Based on Context in VANETs. In Proceedings of the 2020 IEEE
20th International Conference on Communication Technology (ICCT), Nanning, China, 28–31 October 2020; pp. 752–756.
Haydari, A.; Yilmaz, Y. Real-time detection and mitigation of ddos attacks in intelligent transportation systems. In Proceedings
of the 2018 21st International Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC), Maui, HI, USA, 4–7 November 2018;
pp. 157–163.
Valentini, E.P.; Meneguette, R.I.; Alsuhaim, A. An attacks detection mechanism for intelligent transport system. In Proceedings of
the 2020 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Big Data), Atlanta, GA, USA, 10–13 December 2020; pp. 2453–2461.
Alheeti, K.M.A.; Gruebler, A.; McDonald-Maier, K.D. On the detection of grey hole and rushing attacks in self-driving vehicular
networks. In Proceedings of the 2015 7th Computer Science and Electronic Engineering Conference (CEEC), Colchester, UK,
24–25 September 2015; pp. 231–236.
Sultana, R.; Grover, J.; Tripathi, M. A Novel Framework for Misbehavior Detection in SDN-based VANET. In Proceedings of the
2020 IEEE International Conference on Advanced Networks and Telecommunications Systems (ANTS), New Delhi, India, 14–17
December 2020; pp. 1–6.
Gu, K.; Dong, X.; Li, X.; Jia, W. Cluster-Based Malicious Node Detection for False Downstream Data in Fog Computing-Based
VANETs. IEEE Trans. Netw. Sci. Eng. 2022, 9, 1245–1263. [CrossRef]
Li, F.; Guo, Z.; Zhang, C.; Li, W.; Wang, Y. ATM: An active-detection trust mechanism for VANETs based on blockchain. IEEE
Trans. Veh. Technol. 2021, 70, 4011–4021. [CrossRef]
Wang, W.; Luo, T. The minimum delay relay optimization based on nakagami distribution for safety message broadcasting in
urban VANET. In Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference, Doha, Qatar, 3–6 April
2016; pp. 1–6.
Wang, J.; Chen, H.; Sun, Z. Context-Aware Quantification for VANET Security: A Markov Chain-Based Scheme. IEEE Access
2020, 8, 173618–173626. [CrossRef]
Kumar, G.; Saha, R.; Rai, M.K.; Kim, T.H. Multidimensional security provision for secure communication in vehicular ad hoc
networks using hierarchical structure and end-to-end authentication. IEEE Access 2018, 6, 46558–46567. [CrossRef]
Varga, A.; Hornig, R. An overview of the OMNeT++ simulation environment. In Proceedings of the 1st International Conference
on Simulation Tools and Techniques for Communications, Networks and Systems & Workshops, Marseille, France, 3–7 March
2008; pp. 1–10.
Krajzewicz, D.; Erdmann, J.; Behrisch, M.; Bieker, L. Recent development and applications of SUMO—Simulation of Urban
MObility. Int. J. Adv. Syst. Meas. 2012, 5, 128–138.
Sommer, C.; German, R.; Dressler, F. Bidirectionally coupled network and road traffic simulation for improved IVC analysis.
IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. 2010, 10, 3–15. [CrossRef]

